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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UT'AH
ZONA LARSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
BREITLING BROTHERS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
12125

RESPONDENT''S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries alleged to
have resulted from an automobile collision.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court entered a judgment on a jury verdict
in favor of the defendant, no cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks affirmance of the lower court judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties will be referred to in this brief as they
appeared in the court below. Because plaintiff's statement of facts states the evidence in a light most favor1

able to her position rather than most favorable to the
jury verdict, that statement is not accepted. Defendant
offers instead the following:
Plaintiff, a 63-year-old woman, was at the time of
the accident on August 6, 1968 driving under a learner's
permit (R. 163). Prior to receiving her learner's permit
she had not driven since 1928 (R. 187).
As plaintiff traveled south on 3200 West in Granger,
Utah intending to turn left onto 3650 South, a street on
which her daughter lived, she was aware of defendant's
truck following her (R. 190). The truck, driven by defendant's employee Brent Dickey maintained an interval
of about 60 feet behind the plaintiff's automobile at all
times (R. 266). Mr. Dickey had driven the same truck
for defendant all summer and its brakes were in good
condition (R. 268, 321, 322). Mr. Dickey's father owned
trucks of the same type and he had a full familiarity
with such equipment and had driven trucks of this size
owned by his father for several years (R. 269).
As plaintiff drove south on 3200 West she pulled
to the far right side of the lane as if to make room for
the truck to pass (see transcript of proceedings, page 116,
line 10 - an unnumbered page between pages R. 274
and R. 275), then without any warning, and without
giving any signal for a left turn (R. 273, 302, 308, 309)
she suddenly pulled back into the left-hand portion of
the lane, abruptly hit her brakes and jerked to a sudden
stop (R. 273, 282, 308). Mr. Dickey immediately hit his
brakes upon seeing plaintiff's brake lights go on (R. 270,
2

273) and the truck had almost come to a stop when it
struck the rear of plaintiff's automobile (R. 273, 302).
In explaining her curious driving behavior to the
police officer investigating the accident plaintiff stated
that she had moved to the far right and then suddenly
to the left as part of her effort to make a wide left turn
because 3650 South, the road she intended to turn onto,
was a narrow road (R. 250). Plaintiff had previously
told Mr. Dickey, however, that she had pulled to the
right to make room for him to pass her (R. 274).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO
DIRECT A VERDICT FOR THE PLAINTIFF.

Plaintiff's brief presents essentially a jury argument.
It disregards the cardinal rule that on appeal the evidence
and whatever inferences can fairly and reasonably be
drawn therefrom must be viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict. Memmott v. U. S. Fuel Co., 22
Utah 2d 356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969).
Plaintiff argues in her brief that defendant's conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident. In her
argument she even infers that if defendant was guilty
of any negligence then she should be allowed to recover.
No explanation is offered as to why the doctrine of contributory negligence which was pleaded and submitted
to the jury should not apply under the facts here presented.
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The evidence most favorable to the verdict is that
Mr. Dickey was free of any negligence and that the accident was caused by the plaintiff's own negligent conduct. Plaintiff at the trial attempted, of course, to show
to the contrary but the jury chose to find in defendant's
favor. Whether either party was guilty of or free from
negligence could only have been for the jury where, as
here, the evidence was in conflict.
"The trial court properly submitted to the jury
the questions of negligence, contributory negligence and proximate cause, which this court has
held are ordinarily jury questions." Jensen v.
Taylor, 2 Utah 2d 196, 271 P.2d 838, 842 (1954).
See also Hayden v. Cederlund, 1 Utah 2d 171,
263 P.2d 796 (1953).
Plaintiff states in her brief at page 8 that the lower
court erred in failing to direct a verdict in her favor
because of the accident. The negligence of defendant is
alleged to be either following plaintiff's vehicle too
closely or failing to have adequate brakes on its dump
truck. However, to support this position plaintiff relies
exclusively upon the evidence favorable to her and wholly
disregards the very strong and credible evidence which
supports the jury verdict for defendant. This she is not
entitled to do.
Plaintiff admits in her brief at page 14 "that if a
vehicle makes a sudden stop or suddenly decreases its
speed in normal traffic movement, that that would be
negligence, and if it were a proximate cause of the accident, the preceding driver could not recover." Such
4

was the evidence here upon which the jury found in
favor of the defendant. There was strong evidence to
support the jury's finding that plaintiff's improper driving behavior prior to the accident was the proximate
cause of the accident. The jury could properly have
found, as it probably did, since plaintiff was driving on
a learner's permit (R. 163) and drove in a highly erratic fashion, that she failed to meet the standard expected of the average driver. She told the investigating
officer that she had moved first to the right edge of the
road, then to the left and then hit her brakes (R. 248).
Thus, the jury could, and probably did, find that the
truck driver could not reasonably have expected that,
because of her inexperience and lack of skill she would
make a wide and improper turn, then suddenly stop as
she admitted doing to the investigating officer (R. 250).
An independent eyewitness to the accident testified
to plaintiff's curious driving behavior and the abrupt and
erratic movement of her car when she "slammed on her
brakes" (R. 301, 306, 307, 308).
The evidence showed that Mr. Dickey, the driver of
the truck which struck plaintiff, as contrasted with plaintiff's driving behavior at the accident scene, had driven
trucks for several years and was considered by his employer to be "a very good driver; very capable as a driver
of trucks." (R. 316). He hit his brakes as fast as he
could upon seeing the brake lights flash on on plaintiff's
automobile and the truck brakes fully applied (R. 270).
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Plaintiff attempts on this appeal to reconstruct the
evidence and impute negligence to the defendant by
citing to the plaintiff's testimony of having made a left
turn signal prior to her abrupt movement. Her testimony, however, was strongly disputed on this point by
the independent witness, Marlene Orr, as noted above,
thereby creating a jury question as to whether or not
in fact Mr. Dickey had a reasonable warning or any
warning at all that plaintiff would decide to turn left
without signaling and then abruptly stop. The jury quite
obviously found that there was no left-turn signal and
that Mr. Dickey did not have reason to anticipate the
improper driving of Mrs. Larsen. The jury also quite
obviously chose to disbelieve the testimony of plaintiff
and her passenger that the left-turn signal was applied
100 feet prior to the intersection where the turn was to
be made.
The case of Kent v. Freeman, 345 S.W. 2d 252 (Tenn.
1960) cited by plaintiff is not factually similar to the
present case. The evidence in the Kent case was undisputed that the plaintiff had turned on the directional
signal for a considerable length of time prior to being
struck. There was a dispute only as to whether it was
visible to the following driver. The evidence there was
that the defendant's truck which failed to stop was greatly
overloaded as a result of which the brakes were inadequate to stop within a normal interval. The court stated:
"Defendant was driving a l 1h or 2 ton truck
loaded with 71h tons of asphalt which admittedly,
it was not properly equipped with brakes to safely
handle." Id. at 255 (Emphasis added.)
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The court there concluded that the admittedly faulty
brakes, combined with the fact that the defendant had
seen the vehicle in front stopping in sufficient time to
bring his truck to a safe stop, had the brakes been in
repair, made defendant's negligence the sole proximate
cause of the accident.
That case has no value as authority to the totally
different facts of the present case. The second case cited
by plaintiff, Foreman v. American Auto Insurance Co.,
137 So.2d 728 (la. 1962), is also factually dissimilar to
the present case. In Foreman as in Kent the evidence
showed without question that the lead vehicle was struck
solely because the rear vehicle had faulty brakes. There
was no evidence in that case, as there is here, that the
lead vehicle had been driven in an unlawful, erratic or
deceptive manner, since it had simply stopped for road
repairs. Id. at 730.
The court noted:
"The evidence establishes that the brakes on
the Whitehead truck were not in working order
at the time of the accident." Id.

*

*

*

"Whitehead, in fact, acknowledges that he
had 'plenty of time' within which to stop if his
brakes had been operating, and in other parts of
his testimony he verifies the fact that he had
ample time within which to do so." Id. at 731.
The evidence in the present case contrasts sharply
with that in both the Kent and Freeman cases. Mrs. Orr,
the independent eyewitness stated that she saw no left
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signal light on plaintiff's car which she would readily
have seen if it in fact had been turned on (R. 302, 308,
309). Mr. Dickey saw no turn signal from his position
at the rear of plaintiff's automobile (R. 273). The testimony of Mrs. Orr and Mr. Dickey that no directional
signal was given was far more credible to the jury than
the self-serving testimony of the plaintiff and her passenger that the signal was given.
Plaintiff's argument that as a matter of law the
brake's on defendant's truck were inadequate totally disregards substantial, credible evidence to the contrary.
Plaintiff's entire argument hangs on the fact that the
truck's wheels did not lock and skid before the impact.
Plaintiff's own witness - the investigating officer testified that a truck of this type with dual wheels and
dual brakes is the best braking system available and that,
even when operating properly, it may not leave skid
marks:

"Q.

You mean, the fastest stop may not
create a skidmark?
A. This is right." (R. 251).
Similarly the owner of the truck also testified that
even though the brakes were operating properly the
wheels would not be expected to skid at the speed the
truck was traveling at the time of the accident (R. 314,
316).
There was clear, substantial and credible evidence
that the brakes were in proper working order at the time
of the accident. Mr. Dickey had driven this same truck
8

all summer and testified the brakes were in good condition (R. 268, 321, 322). Full-time mechanics kept all of
defendant's equipment in proper repair, including the
truck Mr. Dickey was driving (R. 312).
Plaintiff's efforts to prove that there was something
wrong with the brakes were based upon very unsatisfactory testimony. Plaintiff relied heavily upon the testimony of her expert who was not at the accident scene
and never examined the truck in question (R. 289). His
testimony was not binding on the jury where his conclusions were strongly and convincingly contradicted by
defendant's witnesses. The jury was entitled to disbelieve
plaintiff's contentions in this regard and accept instead
the testimony of defendant's witnesses that the brakes
were in good operating condition at the time of the accident and that the accident resulted from the plaintiff's
own substandard driving. Universal Investment Co. v.
Carpets, Incorporated, 16 Utah 2d 336, 400 P.2d 564,
566 (1965).
Plaintiff claims that under Section 41-6-144(6)(b),
Utah Code Annotated, the truck's brakes on defendant's
vehicle were inadequate as a matter of law since the
statute requires that this truck have:
(1) An equivalent braking force of 43.5%,
and
(2) A deceleration rate of 14 feet per second,
from a stop begun at a speed no more than twenty
miles per hour, and
( 3) A stopping distance of n<;> more than. 40
feet after the brake pedal is applied at 20 miles
per hour.
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Such a claim was not made nor was the statute referred
to in the lower court. Nor was proof presented with
regard to the truck's performance in terms of the standards contained in the statute. Nor did plaintiff's requested jury instructions contain any reference to this
statute. Plaintiff's own expert had made no tests on defendant's truck to determine braking force, deceleration
rate, or stopping distance. Thus it is incredible that such
a claimed violation of this statutory standard would be
raised for the first time on this appeal. Plaintiff's contention that the statutory standard was violated is based
solely upon the lack of skid marks and the fact that an
accident occurred. Neither is sufficient to show even negligence much less a violation of statute.
Plaintiff appears to argue that her expert's opinion
was binding on the jury. The jury was instructed in
Instruction No. 7 that they were entitled to give opinion testimony the weight to which they felt it was entitled. No objection was made to Instruction No. 7. Further, even the case of Gittens v. Lundberg, 3 Utah 2d 392,
24 P.2d 1115, 1117 (1955) - upon which plaintiff relies
- held that "[t]he jury may evaluate the testimony of
witnesses and accept those parts which they deem credible. . . . " Finally, the evidence showed that the vehicle
had a current safety inspection which inspection must
carry a presumption that the brakes met the statutory
standard and were adequate. (See R. 313).
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POINT II
THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY WERE
PROPER.

Plaintiff claims reversible error in Instruction No.
13 on the "sudden peril doctrine." The instruction is
alleged to be improper because inappropriate under the
facts of this case. This court stated in Kryger v. Turner,
479 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah 1971), as regards the sudden
peril doctrine instruction:
"Had there been evidence of a sudden or unexpected situation arising without fault on the
part of the defendant, the instruction would be
proper."
Here there was substantial evidence that the onset
of plaintiff's erratic driving movements immediately before the accident was sudden and without warning.
Plaintiff argues that Instruction No. 13 was improper because Mr. Dickey was "super alert" and thought
he could avoid the collision but did not do so.
The fact that a driver is alert to conditions on the
roadway does not clothe him with the ability to foresee
and avoid the unexpected. Nor does it place upon him
a greater burden than to exercise reasonable care, like
any other driver, if faced with an emergency.
Plaintiff's argument that because Mr. Dickey believed he could avoid the accident, he was negligent if
the accident occurred is contradicted by the case of
Howard v. Ringsby Truck Lines, 2 Utah 2d 65, 269 P.2d
11

295 ( 1954), relied upon in appellant's brief. That case
held that the showing of a mere possibility that an accident might have been avoided is insufficient to show
actionable negligence. Such is the fact here. Under the
evidence presented the lower court would have erred
had it failed to give Instruction No. 13 relating to sudden
peril.
Plaintiff claims error in Instructions Nos. 18, 19 and
22 on the basis that they were not relevant to the issues.
Plaintiff argues with regard to Instruction No. 18 that
the "left turn law could not possibly enter into this case
because the accident had happened before the appellant
ever reached the intersection." Under that logic the "left
turn law" rule could apply only after the turning vehicle
entered the intersection, even though that vehicle braked
suddenly and without warning before reaching the intersection but in anticipation of the intended turn. Such an
argument disregards the purpose of the requirement that
a signal be given 100 feet before the turn is begun, which
is to give a warning to traffic behind, as well as ahead,
that a turn is going to be made.
There is no dispute in the evidence but what plaintiff
intended to and was preparing for a left turn when the
accident occurred (R. 167, 192, 250). Yet if plaintiff's
"upon entering the intersection" argument were accepted
she would be forgiven the duty to signal before making
the turn or to position her automobile properly upon
the roadway before preparing to turn (required by Instruction 18), take precautions to avoid an accident before
12

starting and while making a turn (required by Instruction No. 19), or keep a lookout for other vehicles on the
roadway and avoid making movements which are unreasonable, unsafe, or deceptive to other traffic until she
entered the intersection (required by Instruction No. 22).
Clearly Instructions 18, 19 and 22 were relevant. The
law governing left turns is as much if not more concerned
with what is done prior to the turn as with what is done
while making the turn. See Section 41-6-66, et seq., Utah
Code Annotated, 1953. Because evidence of plaintiff's
failure to take proper precautions before making the turn
was so prominent in the case, Instructions 18, 19 and 22
were proper and essential to a fair consideration of the
issues.
Plaintiff also complains of Instruction No. 23. The
instruction states that a brake light signal given simultaneously with a sudden decrease in speed is negligence.
Plaintiff states the instruction is defective for lack of a
statement that such conduct would be negligent only if
it "unreasonably interfered with the following traffic."
Instruction No. 23 was merely a restatement of Utah
Code Annotated Section 41-6-69(c), 1970:
"No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the
speed of a vehicle without first giving an appropriate signal in a manner provided herein to the
driver of any vehicle immediately to the rear when
there is opportunity to give such signal."
The argument that the brake lights themselves give
the warning required by this statute ignores the very
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language - "without first giving an appropriate signal"
- in the statute.
Plaintiff was required to comply with the statute.
There was substantial evidence that her stop was without
any prior warning whatsoever, and that it did in fact
unreasonably interfere with the traffic behind.
The statutory requirement that persons driving automobiles give advance warning of turns and stops by appropriate signals is purposed to increase safety upon public highways and prevent accidents. Failure to give proper
warning of a turn or stop, particularly a sudden stop, is
unlawful and a misdemeanor by virtue of Utah Code
Annotated Section 41-6-12 ( 1970).
Plaintiff objects to Instruction No. 24 because of the
language in the first sentence:
"Even if you find the two propositions in the
foregoing instruction in favor of the plaintiff .... "
Instruction No. 24 was defendant's offered Instruction No. 28. The first sentence of the instruction referred
to defendant's offered Instruction No. 27 which contained
the two propositions to which the above language refers.
When Judge Faux refused defendant's offered Instruction
No. 27 the above quoted language was not eliminated
from its offered Instruction 28. Neither Judge Faux nor
counsel was aware of this oversight and no objection was
made by counsel on the ground of the above quoted
language when the instruction was given verbatim as
jury Instruction No. 24 (R. 328).
14

Though it may have been more accurate to correct
the instruction it surely was not reversible error to fail
to do so. Defendant suggests that the test of whether an
instruction is confusing to the jury depends upon how it
would be understood by a jury composed of ordinarily intelligent laymen. See Edwards v. Harris, 397 P.2d 87
(Wyo. 1964). The above 16 words could not possibly
have confused the jury when considering the 31 instructions as a whole. The instructions as a whole very clearly
and accurately set forth correct principles to aid the jury
in deciding the case.
CONCLUSION
Seven fact witnesses were called at the trial and the
testimony was on many material points disputed and contradictory. On the whole, the evidence preponderated in
favor of the defendant on all material issues and the jury,
in its role as a finder of facts, so decided. The disputed
issues were fully and fairly presented and, in view of the
clear dispute in the evidence the matter was properly
submitted and argued to the jury.
Plaintiff now claims that the jury should have found
in her favor and she points to the fact that the jury disregarded the evidence and permissible inferences therefrom, which were favorable to her claims. She completely
disregards, however, the credible substantial and material
evidence which was favorable to defendant on every
material issue. It would appear from reading plaintiff's
brief that no evidence favorable to defendant was adduced and that the jury's verdict was not based upon sub-
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stantial evidence. Such is simply not the fact. The jury's
verdict and the judgment entered thereon were not only
proper but supported by a clear weight of the evidence.
The verdict and judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WORSLEY, SNOW &
CHRISTENSEN
and Reed L. Martineau

•

Seventh Floor
Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
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